

Bringing Language Back In  
The Linguistic Constitution of Identity in Japan

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The relationship between language and national identity is hotly contested, and determining the relationship is important for several reasons. First, language can serve as an identity marker or barrier to entry into certain societies. However, language is but one of many markers, barriers, or, as Armstrong notes “symbolic border guards,” (1982; see also Laitin). Race, ethnicity, and gender also play exclusionary roles while religion can be a more subtle example. Nonetheless, language matters to those who speak it. One need only mention bitter disputes over language such as the Basque in Spain, the Quebecois in Canada, and Gaelic speakers in Ireland, among others. Additionally, due to globalization, a contested term that often means Americanization or Westernization, language has become sacred in many societies, an object of protection from global homogenization. Fishman argues, “language becomes part of the secular religion, binding society together. Language is a powerful instrument for promoting internal cohesion and providing an ethnic or national identity. It contributes to values, identity, and a sense of peoplehood. A common vernacular also establishes effective boundaries between ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’,” (1989, cited and quoted in Schmid).

In this paper, I argue that the Japanese language is a base line that strongly correlates with Japanese identity and nationalism. In particular, identity is both constituted and reinforced via dialectics reproduced throughout Japanese society: that of *uchi-soto* and that of *omote-ura*. It is my contention that these combinations, with preference to the former, order Japanese society in such a way that outsiders are not included, thus fostering nationalism. I will show this not only using linguistic analysis, but also through a discussion of the relationship between language and society, and Japanese ambivalence

towards outsiders. In doing so, it is not my intention to assume the existence of identity through space and time, as essentialists might, or to temporally and historically locate its creation per constructivists. In fact, language may serve similar functions in other societies. Rather, I modestly seek to isolate and examine the role language plays in national identity formation and propagation. In the case of Japan there is a strong relationship.

After situating this paper in the existing literature and defining terms to provide common ground, I discuss the role of Japanese as a barrier to entering Japanese society and the dialectics that reinforce and propagate identity, showing that language does matter. Finally, I conclude by briefly discussing Japan's vulnerability to foreign languages, especially English, and the effect this may have on future identity as well as posing questions that warrant further study.

Any discussion of language and identity in Japan should be situated within two frameworks, that of literature on nationalism with respect to language and identity and that of literature on Japan. I will deal with each of these in turn, beginning with three perspectives on language and nation. In large part, due to the failure of both essentialist and modernist positions with regards to the relationship between language and nation, I take a third, ethnicist path. Essentialists opt for a primordialist position while constructivists take a more modernist view. Another camp, that of the ethnicists, tries to split the difference, avoiding the pitfalls of the first two approaches. However, the two former methods heavily influence the ethnicist approach.

For many nationalists, although not for many academics, unchanging cultural qualities, such as a common language, define the nation. This view extends back to the

days of the German Romantics: Herder, Humboldt, and Fichte. The former wrote that a Volk (folk) without a language “is an absurdity... a contradiction in terms,” (May, 58). Humboldt argued that language is the soul of the nation: “From every language we can infer backwards to the national character,” (Humboldt, 154). As such, he is often credited with the theories of linguistic relativism and linguistic determinism. For Humboldt, every language has a different worldview that plays an important role in determining culture (May, 58).

In the field of linguistics, the controversial Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is an extension of this view (see Pinker). It posits, “people who speak different languages are likely to have somewhat different cultural outlooks on the basis that the particular structure of each language results in a culturally specific structuring of reality. Indeed, a strong version of the hypothesis attests that languages are causal vis a vis culturally specific behaviors,” (May, 133). Although I make a similar argument with regards to the role of language in Japanese identity and nationalism, I reject the view that nations are both natural and linguistically determined. Here I subscribe to a weaker version of the hypothesis: that language matters and plays an influential role in the way people think.

Because language may have a similar function in other societies, leading to equifinality and a lack of uniqueness, the essentialist position and Sapir-Whorf are undermined. Furthermore, sharing a language can produce different ends, leading to multifinality. Often this is due to colonization. For example, the United States, Australia, and England all use English. It is the *de facto* dominant language and arguably the *de jure* official language in each. However, all three have different identities and nationalisms. Similarly, France and its former colonial holdings, some of which are

nation-states in the truest sense of the term, especially those in the Caribbean and the Pacific, obviously have very different conceptions of nationalism and identity (see Glissant).

For modernists, the nation is a social construct, hence the connection to constructivists. This view posits that more subjective criteria are needed to discuss nations and identity than preexisting cultural traits because the link between modern nations and history, as well as language, is not necessarily continuous (May, 59), although this true in the case of Japan. As Renan notes, “Language may invite us to unite, but it does not compel us to do so,” (1990, 16). For Renan, an early modernist who influenced Anderson, the forgetting and use of history was an important factor, one that required continual negotiation. Thus, the “will to nation” is a choice made by members of a group.

Additionally, nations (and by extension nation-states, which are nations combined with Weber’s definition of a state: an organizing body with a monopoly on the use of legitimate force in a fixed territory) are “product[s] of very specific social, economic and political circumstances. Their emergence as the primary social community in the modern era is directly related to the advent of modernisation and the concomitant rise of the state and the ideology of nationalism,” the latter of which is a product of the Enlightenment and the material conditions that followed, such as the Industrial Revolution (May, 63). As such appeals to common history, culture, and tradition are often invented or imagined.

For Gellner, the rise of nationalism stems from the industrialization of Europe towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (1983). Anderson places it earlier, in congruence with the beginnings of print capitalism, in which language obviously plays a role (1991). There

are divisions in the modernist camp, but all are in agreement that modernization, be it political or economic, precludes the nation, not ethnicity. “Nationalism has produced nations... and national identity, not the other way around,” (May, 68). Evidence also supports the constructivists: modern Japanese nationalism first became a force during the rapid modernization of the Meiji Reformation, reaching a violent apex during World War II.

Despite the ability of modernism to refute aspects of primordial versions of the nation, there are two major, and related, critiques of the approach. First, because nations are products of specific sociohistorical factors, such as political and economic modernization, the modernist view suffers from a similar brand of determinism as the primordial one. Just as preexisting language and ethnicity determine identity for essentialists, the aforementioned factors do so for modernists. By asserting uniqueness, the essentialists are able to explain differing types of nationalism and identity, although making it difficult to compare them. The modernists, however, are hard pressed to account for differences due to macro-level causes like modernization that effect large numbers of cases in similar ways. As such, they often miss the details.

Second, if nationalism supersedes ethnicity, as modernists assert, how can one explain nationalism in the current world? Should it follow that internationalism replace nationalism? As May correctly argues, modernists are caught in a bind because the latter has not occurred and modernists cannot account for the former (68). The rise of often-brutal ethnonationalisms, such as those in Rwanda and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia attest to this. As Smith notes “ethnicity remains a powerful, explosive and durable force,” (1995, 34).

In sum, essentialism overemphasizes the role of preexisting structures like ethnicity and language, failing to recognize that historical disjunctures between past and present mean that material and sociohistorical contexts matter. Conversely, it is only through deep game and thick description that modernism can (shakily) account for differences in the formation of nations. Additionally, the steadfastness of nationalism in the contemporary world damages this view. A third way, one that can take into account the role of ethnicity and language while acknowledging that these concepts do not take place in an ideational vacuum or fully constitute nationalism, is needed.

The ethnicist approach adheres to much of modernist thought, but also attempts to correct its conflation of nation and nation-state along with the denigration of ethnonationalisms. Using this perspective one can see that not only are there commonalities between the premodern and modern eras, but also that evidence of nationalist sentiment based on ethnies, “ethnic identities and its symbolism,” predates nationalism (Smith, 1986; see also Smith, 1995; Seton-Watson, 1977, Armstrong, 1982). Examples of such ethnies abound, from ancient Greece and Rome to the Bible to early medieval Europe (Smith, 1986). Japan, with its history of relative isolation, represents one such ethnie. The ethnicist approach seeks to bridge the gap between modern and premodern, between primordial and modernist views, avoiding the sweeping claims of each side.

By focusing on language, I seem to make more of a primordialist argument, as it is one of the premodern ties that bind. However, it is also the case that the Japanese language did not become codified and organized until the Meiji Reformation and again after defeat in World War II (Gottlieb, 1994). In the premodern era it may have been the

case that language served as a “symbolic border guard” per Armstrong, but modern nationalism helps to imbue it with the functions I postulate because the barriers and dialectics can be supported by the tools of a nation-state. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, an ethnicist view of language is the most optimal. Not only can it account for premodern ties among Japanese, but also for the creation of identity in the modern Japanese nation-state. Both primordial and modernist views have a tendency to essentialize, whether it is based on culture, or sociohistorical contexts. For this reason, it is important to briefly address the roles of structure and agency in this paper and why I lean towards the former.

Primordialists tend to postulate linguistic determinism and modernists focus on changing material and ideational conditions. Ethnicists use a similarly structural approach. It is not my intention to begin anew the chicken-and-egg debate of structure and agency (see Giddens, 1979 and 1984; Archer, 1986 and 1992), but it bears mention that although a structure, language is the creation of agents, although this agency occurs in material, ideational, and cultural contexts. As identity is more the product of structure than agency, and language is a structural condition (Matthews), this paper favors the former. I now seek to locate this paper within literature on Japan, in particular identity and the *uchi-soto* dialectic.

Most of the literature on Japanese identity begins with *nihonjinron*, an essentializing view that Japan is unique and often defines Japan in opposition to some, usually Western but also Asian, Other (see Kelly). A thought-provoking contemporary example is Befu’s “Hegemony of Homogeneity,” (2001). The author argues that *nihonjinron* is both a commodity and a substitute for the discredited nationalist symbols of World War II. He

uses one of the most globally popular views of nationalism, “interest theory” whereby nationalism is “an ideological weapon used by the government and by the dominant social groups.” This argument holds some water in large part due to both the Marxist orientation of many Japanese historians and the structure of Japan’s economy (Pyle, 10-11). Befu’s argument ties in nicely with Ivy’s (post)modernist discussion of “the vanishing,” as commodity in Japan (1995).

Other scholars take a more cultural approach with regards to Japanese identity. In terms of nationalism this method analyses “Japanese cultural patterns and symbols as the shaping force in the formulation of nationalist ideology,” (Pyle, 14). It is also, for obvious reasons, the most common perspective for anthropologists (see P. Smith, 1997; Ben-Ari, et al.; Clammer; Scheiner; Yoshino; and Miller, 1982). As language is often an integral part of culture, this is the approach I take as well. Additionally, much of my analysis is based on the Japanese dialectics of *uchi-soto* and *omote-ura*. Both have been applied to domestic groupings within Japanese society (see Bachnik, Ishida, and Wetzel), but none have done so on the national level. As such, much of my analysis is based on their microfoundations, but takes them a step further by postulating that Japanese society is the penultimate in-group.

To return briefly to *nihonjinron*, it is important to note that while my attempts to avoid the “Japan as unique” argument reflect a bias against what I think is the essentializing nature of *nihonjinron*, I do recognize that this view is a powerful force both in and outside academia with regards to nationalism, identity and beyond. As such, this view is one that should be explored and analyzed. Nonetheless, it is not the purpose of this paper to treat such a task. Suffice to say that I subscribe to Ishida’s maxim that “If there is

nothing in common between Japanese and other societies, we cannot compare at all,” (Ishida, 17). Having discussed the approaches used in this paper, locating it within the literature, I now turn, briefly, to several definitions that will prove useful on our journey.

Identity, as it used here, follows not only Smith’s definition in which it is “a sense of community based on history and culture,” (1986, 14), but also that of political science whereby collectivity and ideology play integral roles. Part of strong cultural identification is power, getting others in your group to want what you want. Here ideology can play an important role. Witness the use of racism and racist symbolism in World War II (Dower). In fact, it is easy to make the case that the latter definition is subsumed in the former, as both history and culture paint with broad strokes. By Japanese society, I refer to the approximately 95% of the country that is ethnolinguistically Japanese. This does not include Koreans, the largest minority group in Japan, be they fourth generation or first because even if they speak Japanese or have Japanese surnames they are not viewed as ethnically “Japanese” (Ross and De Vos, 272). I witnessed firsthand their exclusion from Japanese society when living in Osaka (see Ryang, 1997 and 2000; on immigration and Japan see Brody, and Weiner and Tadashi). Similarly, Ainu are also excluded from this definition.

For our purposes, following May (54) and Guibernau (1996) the group of people that comprise a nation share a homeland or historic territory; common historical memories or myths thereof; a common culture; and a shared sense of political destiny and self-determination. Nationalism is a nation-state level feeling of community and patriotism, a division of which is ethnonationalism that may occur subnationally. Having acquired a

common understanding of terminology, we now turn our attention to the investigation of identity in Japan.

It is imperative to delve into the relationship between society and language because the latter can be an impediment to entering the former. Although the role of language as obstacle is waning, in large part due to increased interest in Japan because of its post-WWII economic rise and societal embrace of many Western terms (see Passin, Hoffler), it is still a functional, durable barrier. Language factors into identity formation and propagation much greater than that of race or religion, the latter in particular playing such a minor role in regards to Japan that I will not treat it here (see Clarke, Jansen, Lopez, Jr., Yusa).

There is a strong relationship between being and speaking Japanese (Loveday, 1982 and 1986). Although to the best of my knowledge never formally calculated in the case of Japan, Greenberg's H-index, "the probability that if two members of the population are chose at random [in a certain community], they will have at least one language in common," (1956, 112), would be quite high (close to 1 as 0 is the lowest). Some scholars have gone so far as to note that learning a second language is difficult in Japan due to the relationship between language and identity (Hall and Gudykunst, 1986; Nisugi, 1974), although this may be changing. Nonetheless, while the relationship between language and identity creates problems for those in Japan who do not speak Japanese, it is more problematic for non-members of Japanese society who speak Japanese. Notes SanAntonio:

Since speaking Japanese is linked closely with ethnic identity, when a foreigner speaks Japanese well, the ethnic difference between foreigner and Japanese is reduced to the 'Asian-ness' of the Japanese (Miller, 1977). This creates problems because the Japanese do not base their identity on a notion of fellowship with other Asians, but consider themselves unique (Miller, 1977). The

Japanese cultural hierarchy and identity *vis a vis* other Asian ethnic groups is threatened. If a foreigner speaks Japanese well, then the cultural attributes which enable an individual to claim Japanese identity are emphasized making it difficult for Japanese to retain the view of themselves as unique. (1988).

Thus, the use of Japanese remains that of a border guard, part of a discourse of power (see Chomsky, Fairclough, Foucault, Kedar, Kelling, Lakoff), in this case the ability to in- and exclude, that trumps feelings of commonality based on race.

Although crossing the linguistic border is difficult because Japanese language and society are nearly coterminous, it is also quite possible, as evidenced primarily by others who live there, such as Koreans, Okinawans, Ainu, and numerous foreigners. Thus, at this point, we turn to the linguistic dialectics that advance and strengthen Japanese nationalism and identity. It is my contention that after passing one barrier, outsiders run into yet another.

*Uchi* and *soto* literally translate as “inside” and “outside,” but they have other meanings, that of “self” and “society,” (Bachnik, 3), and yet another, “in-group” and out-group,” respectively. It is important to note the concept of binary opposition in the dialectic: *uchi* cannot exist without *soto*, and *visa versa*. In short, they are mutually constitutive. The same is true of *omote* and *ura*, discussed later.

Initially, by looking at *soto*'s literal meaning of “outside,” a significant association should be noted. The character (*kanji*, the Japanese alphabet with origins in Chinese ideo- and pictograms) for *soto*, when combined with that for “person” (*hito*) forms what translates as “outside person.” It is read as *gaijin*, slang for “foreigner”. Additionally, the character for *uchi* also means “home”. Japanese children learn all three of these *kanji* by age seven and speak the words earlier. Perhaps by associating the familiarity and

comforts of “home” in opposition to outsiders the roots of Japanese identity grow early, in no small part due to language (see Pinker).

The “-group” definitions of *uchi* and *soto* are not unlike Weber’s *Binnenmoral* and *Aussenmoral* that also focus on in-group—out-group relations (Ishida, 18). In both Japanese and Weber’s typology the in-group is “composed of those who can share the feeling of ‘we’ among themselves,” (Ishida, 18-19). The crucial difference between Japanese dialectics and Weberian ideal types is that in the former *amae*, emotional dependency, is present.

A true definition of *amae* is difficult, if not impossible, but it lies at the intersection of discourse and emotion (see Lutz and Abu-Lughod, and Shimizu and LeVine). Doi, who first used the term in this way, gives several different possibilities, ranging from the aforementioned to the urge “to draw close to another person” (168) to the achingly poetic “desire to deny the fact of separation that is an inevitable part of human existence, and to obliterate the pain that this separation involves,” (167). Initially, *amae* is first experienced by breastfeeding infants who feel not only dependent, but also the yearning to be passively loved and separation anxiety (7). Doi asserts that these feelings often continue into adulthood; his study explores the effects of *amae* to this end. “On the personal level, this means that within his own [a Japanese person’s] most intimate circle, and to diminishing degrees outside that circle, he seeks relationships that however binding they may be in their outward aspects, allow him to presume, as it were, on familiarity,” (8). Because this *amae* relationship is well established among members of an in-group (Maynard, 156), we now turn to the “circles” within to see how far *amae* extends.

At a base level, the self is the in-group, society the out-group. For Ishida, in-group circles are typically concentric, based around family, village, prefecture, and nation (18-19). There are a number of words meaning “self” in Japanese. One of the more common words is *jibun*, which literally translates as “portion given to self.” Who grants this autonomy to the self? Due to binary opposition, self and society are mutually constitutive. As a result, the Japanese self is a part of society, perhaps a concept existing only in relation to society. However, the circles are not static. Notes Wetzel, “It [*uchi*] is a changing, forming, fluid awareness based on social relationships, and it bears meaning in relation to one’s thought, to other people, to contexts,” (83-84). Ishida agrees, adding, albeit tautologically, that *uchi* and *soto* have a flexible border because circles can be enlarged and contracted (18-19).

Additionally, in-group relations are not constantly harmonious. They are filled with everyday conflict that is resolved by *amae* (for example, on gender conflict see Itakura). “The *amae* relationship is expected to survive day-to-day emotional skirmishes among its members. Conflicts between people who do not share the *amae* relationship, however, can be potentially harmful, even destructive,” (Maynard, 156).

This above sentence begs the questions: do the circles of in-group and *amae* extend beyond the shores of Japan, or even Japanese society? Can they? The latter is hard to prove due to the conflict between the linguistic structures of *uchi-soto* and the fluidity of groupings. I tentatively postulate an answer in the affirmative, for the Japanese are not prisoner of their language. To drag a cliché out of the closet, time will tell. However, in my hesitant answer to the second question, I have given away the answer to the first.

De Vos asserts that

intellectuals of the 1990s do not insist on Japanese uniqueness, but they recognize a continuing Japanese isolation within the international community. A Japanese brand of exclusory racism persists in the general public. There is aversion to extending citizenship toward those of non-Japanese origin and toward a segment of its population that bears the stigma of past premodern outcaste status, still attributed by many to some supposed non-Japanese ancestors (272).

Fourth generation Koreans, even those (or especially those) who have intermarried, are routinely denied citizenship (Lee). They must carry identification cards with fingerprints at all times. Moreover, in a 1995 NHK poll, only 15% of respondents disagreed to varying degrees with the statement “the crime rate will rise if an increased number of foreigners seek permanent residence in Japan” compared to nearly 65% who agreed in one form or another (Appendix I). Similarly, only 13% of respondents thought that the number of foreigners seeking permanent residency in Japan, a physical assault on the in-group territory, should increase (Appendix II). Another dialectic, though less powerful, also plays a role in Japanese identity and in-group conflict, that of *omote* and *ura*.

Although *omote* translates to “surface” or “front”, it can mean much more, including what is publicly legitimate, a dramatized and dignified element, a formal arena, and formality and rigidity. *Ura*, on the other hand, reads as “back”, but also means backstage, privately allowed, practical and efficient, informal and flexible. Similar to *uchi* and *soto* these words are functional equivalents, like yin and yan (Ishida, 21-22). *Omote* corresponds to *soto*, while *ura* and *uchi* remain distinct, separate, and hidden from view. The fluid, flexible notion of *uchi* may stem from this relationship. Taken alone, the *omote-ura* dichotomy has little importance to our analysis, but when coupled with *uchi* and *soto*, a model for conflict management is created.

*Omote* (surface, formal arena) *Ura* (backstage, informal area)

*Uchi* (in-group) no conflict should exist      conflict solved implicitly, informally

*Soto* (out-group) no concessions made      negotiation possible if no loss of face

(Ishida, 17).

As one can see, *uchi-omote* is the most harmonious course. Conversely, *soto-omote* is the most conflictual. At the surface level, then, groupings determine conflictual relations. Within the in-group, conflict is either nonexistent or solved backstage with the purpose of putting up a united front. With regards to the out-group, however, negotiation occurs behind the scenes only with qualifications. Taken as national groups, Japan in the *uchi* row, the model reinforces Japanese identity.

In sum, although fluid and contextual, it appears that the Japanese in-group and the *amae* that comes with it do not extend beyond Japanese society. Due to linguistic structures that come into play in early childhood, the *uchi-soto* dialectic acts as a base line of Japanese identity. Via its in- and out-groups, and mutual constitution of self and society, the exclusionary view of identity is formulated and reinforced. As such, the concentric in-groups of Japanese society can be used to foster nationalism. Notes Coser: “When belonging is relevant, the Japanese express rather explicitly through strategies of communication that they belong to a particular group,” (32).

I conclude with two questions for which I do not have the answers. The first involves recent developments in Japan regarding globalization and the homogenizing force of what Barber terms “McWorld” (1995). The use of English and *katakana*, the alphabet

used for foreign words, is on the rise while the government contracts the number of *kanji* in circulation seemingly every year. What will happen to Japanese identity when the Japan that can say no is doing so increasingly in English, if and when Japanese literally becomes “the vanishing”? What effects might this have on conflict within Japan? It will be interesting to see what unfolds on this front.

Second, although the groups of *uchi* and *soto* are unique to Japan, language acts as a border guard and very much matters in other settings. To name but a few:

The Welsh word ‘*iath*’, for example, originally meant both language and community; the word for foreigner, ‘*anghyfiaith*’, means ‘not of the same language’; while the word for a compatriot, ‘*cyfiaith*’, means ‘of the same language’. Likewise, the Basque define their territory ‘*Euskalherria*’ on the basis of where “*Euskera*”, the Basque language, is spoken. Frequently invoked nationalist slogans also reflect the primacy given to the language and identity link: ‘*sluagh gun chanain, sluagh gun anam*’ is Gaelic for ‘A people without its language is like a people without its soul’, while ‘*Hep brezhoneg, breizh ebet*’ is Breton for ‘without Breton there is no Brittany’ (May, 132).

Whether dialectics of groupings are present for these and other languages I do not know, but it may be worth investigating.

In the case of Japan, language does matter. Via barriers and discourse, language helps frame the way many Japanese people see and experience the world. It plays an integral role in Japanese views of self and outsiders. Through the dialectics of *uchi-soto*, and *omote-ura*, groups are created and framed with the purposes of in- and exclusion. These groups play a role in constituting and reinforcing Japanese identity by creating boundaries and managing conflicts within societal groupings. The concept of *amae* adds dependency, furthering in-group bonds and cohesion. Thus, there is a strong basis for, at least in part, the linguistic constitution of Japanese identity.

## Appendix I

<b>SURVEY ORGANIZATION:</b>	<b>NHK BROADCASTING CULTURE RESEARCH INSTITUTE</b>
<b>SURVEY SPONSOR:</b>	<b>NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corp.)</b>
<b>RELEASE DATE:</b>	<b>January 6, 1995</b>
<b>INTERVIEW DATES:</b>	<b>January 14, 1995 to January 22, 1995</b>
<b>SAMPLE DESCRIPTION:</b>	<b>National adult (age 16 and over)</b>
<b>SAMPLE SIZE:</b>	<b>1,256</b>
<b>INTERVIEW METHOD:</b>	<b>Personal</b>

### **QUESTION**

Do you agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or disagree with the view that the crime rate will rise if an increased number of foreigners seek permanent residence in Japan, or is it difficult to say?

<b>RESPONSES</b>	<b>%</b>
Agree	38
Somewhat agree	26
Difficult to say	19
Somewhat disagree	6
Disagree	9
Don't know	3
No response	0

**Notes:** All responses of less than .5 percent have been rounded to 0.

([http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/S8\\_XzQQxZP0g2r1IMDqijPNrKA/HAHTpage/Summary\\_Link?RCQU\\_QSTN\\_ID=9097](http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/S8_XzQQxZP0g2r1IMDqijPNrKA/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=9097) Accessed March 23, 2003).

## Appendix II

<b>SURVEY ORGANIZATION:</b>	<b>NHK BROADCASTING CULTURE RESEARCH INSTITUTE</b>
<b>SURVEY SPONSOR:</b>	<b>NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corp.)</b>
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<b>INTERVIEW METHOD:</b>	<b>Personal</b>

### **QUESTION**

Should the number of foreigners seeking permanent residency in Japan increase a lot, somewhat increase, remain the same, somewhat decrease, or decrease a lot?

<b>RESPONSES</b>	<b>%</b>
Increase a lot	3
Somewhat increase	10
Remain the same	35
Somewhat decrease	22
Decrease a lot	13
Don't know	17
No response	0

**Notes:** All responses of less than .5 percent have been rounded to 0.

([http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/S8\\_XzQQxZP0g2r1IMDqijPNrKA/HAHTpage/Summary\\_Link?RCQU\\_QSTN\\_ID=9101](http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/S8_XzQQxZP0g2r1IMDqijPNrKA/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=9101) Accessed March 23, 2003).

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